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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW 
The North Dakota Supreme Court Review summarizes significant 
decisions rendered by the North Dakota Supreme Court.  The purpose of the 
Review is to identify cases of first impression, cases of significantly altered 
earlier interpretations of North Dakota law, and other noteworthy cases.  As 
a special project, Associate Editors assist in researching and writing the 
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AUTOMOBILES—ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE—
STATUTES 
 Kroschel v. Levi 
 
In Kroschel v. Levi,2 Kroschel appealed from the suspension of her 
driving privileges.3  She claimed that the arresting officer, as an employee 
of the North Dakota State University (“NDSU”) Police Department, did not 
have jurisdiction to arrest her off-campus.4  The North Dakota Supreme 
Court found the district court holding erroneous and reversed based on four 
statutes.5  The court held that NDSU officers do not have jurisdiction to 
arrest persons outside the NDSU campus under sections 40-20-05 and 15-
10-17(2) of the North Dakota Century Code (“Century Code”).6  The court 
also held that section 44-08-24 only allows temporary assistance and 
exchanging of officers.7  Lastly, the court concluded that section 54-40.3 
did not authorize the agreement granting Haskell concurrent jurisdiction.8 
The arresting officer, Haskell, believed he was acting under authority 
granted by a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”).9  This was an 
agreement between the Fargo and NDSU Police Departments, which stated 
that Haskell had city-wide jurisdiction.10  The MOU was signed by the 
NDSU President of Business and Finance, the Director of University Policy 
and Safety of NDSU, the Fargo Interim Police Chief, and Fargo’s Mayor.11 
The hearing officer found the MOU valid under sections 40-20-05 and 
15-10-17(2) of the Century Code.12  The district court disagreed, finding 
that the officer had authority under section 44-08-24(1) of the Century Code 
but not under the statutes relied on by the hearing officer.13  The district 
court also addressed section 54-40.3-04, stating that this section was 
 
2. 2015 ND 185, 866 N.W.2d 109.  
3. Kroschel, ¶ 1, 866 N.W.2d at 111. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. ¶ 37, 866 N.W.2d at 121. 
6. Id. ¶ 36. 
7. Id.  
8. Id. 
9. Id. ¶ 3, 866 N.W.2d at 111. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. ¶¶ 8-11, 866 N.W.2d at 113, 114. 
13. Id. ¶ 5, 866 N.W.2d at 112. 
          
2015] NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW 439 
inapplicable because it only authorized agreements made between North 
Dakota and another state.14  The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that it 
will not affirm the district court if “the order is not in accordance with the 
law.”15  The North Dakota Supreme Court analyzed the four statutes 
involved in the previous decisions to determine its holding.16 
First, the court reviewed the hearing officer’s interpretation of section 
40-20-05.17  Although the hearing officer read the statute to allow the chief 
of police to give their officers jurisdiction throughout Fargo, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court highlighted that this authority may only be granted 
under the chief’s supervision.18  Since Officer Haskell was not under the 
supervision of the Fargo Police Department, the court found section 40-20-
05 did not give him authority.19 
Second, the court referenced section 15-10-17(2)20 under which the 
administrative hearing found authority for the board of higher education to 
approve concurrent jurisdiction.21  However, the statute limits this power so 
that the board of higher education may only authorize concurrent 
jurisdiction “at its institutions.”22  The court found this language as clear 
evidence that the board may not authorize jurisdiction off-campus.23  
Therefore, the arrest was also not authorized under section 15-10-17.24 
Third, the supreme court reviewed section 44-08-24(1) of the Century 
Code,25 which the district court determined to authorize Haskell to make the 
arrest of Kroschel.26  This statute grants the assistance and exchange of 
peace officers among criminal justice agencies in North Dakota on a 
 
14. Id. 
15. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-46 (2013). 
16. Kroschel, ¶ 5, 866 N.W.2d at 112. 
17. Id. ¶ 8, 866 N.W.2d at 113 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-20-05 (2013)). 
18. Id. 
19. Id. ¶ 10, 866 N.W.2d at 114. 
20. The statute stipulates the powers of the board of higher education, including the power to 
“authorize the employment of law enforcement officers having concurrent jurisdiction with other 
law enforcement officers to enforce laws and regulations at its institutions.”  N.D. CENT. CODE § 
15-10-17 (2013).  
21. Kroschel, ¶ 12, 866 N.W.2d at 114. 
22. Id. 
23. Id.  
24. Id. ¶ 33, 866 N.W.2d at 120. 
25. “Any appointive or elective agency or office of peace officers, as defined in § 12-63-01, 
may establish policies and procedures or enter agreements with other agencies and offices and a 
state or local criminal justice agency of this state may establish policies and procedures or enter 
agreements with other criminal justice agencies of this state to: (a) assist other state and local 
criminal justice agencies; and (b) exchange the criminal justice agency’s peace officers with peace 
officers of another criminal agency on a temporary basis.”  N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-08-24(1) 
(2013).  
26. Kroschel, ¶ 13, 866 N.W.2d at 114. 
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temporary basis.27  The district court determined that the term “on a 
temporary basis” referenced the exchange of officers but did not apply to 
the assistance of intrastate officers.28  Kroschel argued that the term “on a 
temporary basis” is intended to apply to both the assisting and the 
exchanging of officers.29 
The court settled this dispute by using the rule of interpretation 
directing the court to read related statutes together and attempt to find a 
common meaning among them.30  The court referenced section 44-08-20, 
which also authorized “additional powers of peace assistance in a particular 
. . . violation of law.”31  Subsection 3 of this statute clarifies that this 
assistance may only be given upon request and only for a non-continual 
basis.32  Another similar statute construes “assistance” as temporary.33  The 
North Dakota Supreme Court found the statutes as evidence that the 
legislature intended to make assistance of criminal justice agencies to be 
temporary only, 34  and therefore section 44-08-24(1) did not give Haskell 
authority.35   
Fourth, the North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s 
analysis of section 54-40.3-04.36  The court found that the district court 
erred in concluding that the statute required the agencies to be interstate to 
form an agreement.37  The court noted that section 54-40.3-01 clarifies that 
a political subdivision may enter into an agreement with another political 
subdivision of this state.38  Therefore, the statute does authorize intrastate 
agreements between political subdivisions.39 
The document was signed by a political subdivision and the NDSU 
Police Department, an institutional subdivision, as required under 54-40.3-
04.40  However, the section also requires a signature by the governing 
body.41 Therefore, the MOU needed to be signed by the board of higher 
 
27. Id. ¶ 15, 866 N.W.2d at 115. 
28. Id. ¶ 16. 
29. Id. 
30. Martin v. Stutsman Cty. Soc. Servs., 2005 ND 117, ¶ 13, 698 N.W.2d 278, 281. 
31. Kroschel, ¶ 19, 866 N.W.2d at 115-16. 
32. Id. 
33. State v. Demars, 2007 ND 145, ¶ 10, 738 N.W.2d 486, 489. 
34. Kroschel, ¶ 21, 866 N.W.2d at 116-17. 
35. Id. ¶ 19, 866 N.W.2d at 116. 




40. Id. ¶ 28. 
41. Id. 
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education and the attorney general.42  Since the attorney general did not 
sign the MOU, the document was deficient and did not authorize officer 
Haskell to arrest Kroschel.43 
Since the four statutes evaluated by the lower courts failed to give 
authority, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the district court’s 
holding.44  Kroschel urged the court to grant her attorney’s fees.45  The 
court found that, in order for the court to award Kroschel attorney fees, she 
must prove that the Department acted without substantial justification.46  
Century Code section 28-32-50 provides that substantial justification must 
be proven by showing the officer was “justified to a degree that could 
satisfy a reasonable person.”47  Since both the hearing officer and the 
district court found a reasonable basis in law and fact that the officer had 






















42. N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-40.3-01(2) (2013). 
43. Kroschel, ¶ 32, 866 N.W.2d at 120. 
44. Id. ¶ 36, 866 N.W.2d at 121. 
45. Id. ¶ 34, 866 N.W.2d at 120. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. ¶ 35. 
48. Id. at 121. 
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AUTOMOBILES—CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—SEARCHES AND 
SEIZURES 
 Beylund v. Levi 
 
Beylund v. Levi,49 presented a question of first impression as to whether 
the criminal refusal statute violates the Fourth Amendment under the 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.50  Beylund appealed from a district 
court judgment, which affirmed the Department of Transportation decision 
to suspend Beylund’s driving privileges for two years.51  The North Dakota 
Supreme Court affirmed the district court decision, finding that the criminal 
refusal statute did not violate the Fourth Amendment under the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine.52 
After being read the implied consent advisory, Beylund consented to a 
chemical blood test.53  The test revealed an alcohol concentration of 0.250 
g/100ml.54  Beylund argued the chemical test was an unconstitutional 
warrantless search and the implied consent law violates the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine.55  The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the 
decision de novo as required for constitutional challenges.56  The 
presumption of constitutionality must be rebutted beyond a reasonable 
doubt in order for the statute to be found invalid.57 
“A person may not drive . . . if . . . that individual refuses to submit to a 
chemical test . . . to determine the alcohol concentration . . . in the 
individual’s blood, breath, or urine.”58  The refusal to submit to such test is 
“punishable in the same manner as driving under the influence” under 
Century Code section 39-20-01.59  Since the chemical test is a search under 
the Fourth Amendment, the court determined whether the implied consent 
law is an unconstitutional condition.60 
 
49. 2015 ND 18, 859 N.W.2d. 403. 
50. Beylund, ¶ 1, 859 N.W.2d. at 406. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. ¶ 3, 859 N.W.2d. at 406. 
54. Id.  
55. Id. ¶ 5.  Beylund also argued the criminal refusal statute violates the Fourth Amendment 
or article I, section 8 of the North Dakota Constitution, which the court dismissed based on 
rationale given in State v. Birchfield, 2015 ND 6, 858 N.W.2d 302.  Beylund, ¶ 1, 859 N.W.2d. at 
406. 
56. Beylund, ¶ 8, 859 N.W.2d. at 407. 
57. Id. ¶ 17, 859 N.W.2d. at 409. 
58. Id. at 410. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01 (2013)) 
59. Id.  
60. Id. 
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The unconstitutional condition doctrine provides that ordinarily the 
“government may not grant a benefit conditioned on the surrender of a 
constitutional right even if the government may withhold the benefit 
altogether.”61  The government may impose conditions on the right so long 
as those conditions are reasonable.62  The court agreed with the Minnesota 
Supreme Court in finding that “in order to proceed with a claim of 
unconstitutional conditions, the defendant must show the criminal refusal 
statute authorizes an unconstitutional search.”63  The court then referred to 
its analysis in State v. Birchfield64 to determine the statute’s reasonableness 
through the balancing test.65  The governmental interest in lowering drunk 
driving rates is significant.66  Also, the implied consent laws protect against 
suspicionless requests for chemical tests.67 
The court noted that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
invalidates laws only if the condition is not significantly relevant to the 
governmental interest.68  The criminal refusal statute satisfies this standard 
because it deters drunken driving, induces drivers to take the test, and 
removes drunk drivers from the road.69  Finally, the court determined that 
the state interest is related to the privilege of driving, making the implied 
consent laws reasonable.70  The court urged that the driver may avoid 
harsher punishment by refusing to submit to the chemical test and also that 
a driver’s expectation of privacy is lowered while driving a vehicle.71  For 
these reasons, the court affirmed that district court judgment having 





61. Id. ¶ 18. (citing 16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 411 (2009) & Supp. 2014)). 
62. Id. 
63. Id. ¶ 22, 859 N.W.2d. at 412. (citing State v. Netland, 762 N.W.2d 202, 212 (Minn. 
2009)). 
64. 2015 ND 6, 858 N.W.2d 302. 
65. Beylund, ¶ 23, 859 N.W.2d. at 412. 
66. Id.  
67. Id. 
68. Id. ¶ 25, 859 N.W.2d. at 413. 
69. Id.  
70. Id. ¶ 27, 859 N.W.2d. at 413-14. 
71. Id. at 414. 
72. At the time of writing, this case, along with State v. Birchfield and a Minnesota 
companion case, was on appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States with it being argued 
that these statutes were unconstitutional.  U.S. Supreme Court Hearing N.D. Cases on April 20, 
N.D. SUP. CT., http://www ndcourts.gov/court/news/USSupremeCourtND 2016 htm. 
73. Beylund, ¶ 30, 859 N.W.2d at 414. 
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CHILD SUPPORT—ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE—
APPEAL AND ERROR 
 Schiele v. Schiele 
 
In Schiele v. Schiele,74 Bradley Schiele appealed from an amended 
divorce judgment, which required Bradley to pay child support for his child, 
C.B.S.75  The court found that Bradley could not prove that his child 
support should be offset based on benefits C.B.S. was receiving from the 
government.76  The court also held that the divorce judgment controlled to 
determine that Brenda has primary residential responsibility.77  
Consequently, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court 
decision.78 
After the divorce judgment, Brenda filed to have a court order Bradley 
to pay child support.79  Although the child is autistic and lives at the Life 
Skills and Transition Center (“Center”), the district court approved, 
requiring that Bradley give $2,053 per month to Brenda as child support.80  
Bradley moved to amend this judgment on the basis that since the child 
lives with neither party, neither party should be considered to have primary 
residential responsibility of C.B.S.81  The district court determined this 
motion to be untimely and unsupported by facts and accordingly denied the 
motion.82  Bradley then appealed, stating that he has no obligation to pay 
child support while C.B.S is living at the Center and that his child support 
should be offset by C.B.S’s benefits.83 
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that the standard of review for 
child support determinations is de novo for questions of law.84  The court 
referred to the guidelines for child support under N.D. Administrative Code 
section 75-02-04.1.85  Subsection 02(9) of that section provides that child 
support is appropriate when the parents do not live together.86  The court 
 
74. 2015 ND 169, 865 N.W.2d 433. 
75. Schiele, ¶ 1, 865 N.W.2d at 435. 
76. Id. ¶ 18, 865 N.W.2d at 438. 
77. Id. ¶ 13, 865 N.W.2d at 439. 
78. Id. ¶ 1, 865 N.W.2d at 435. 
79. Id. ¶ 3, 865 N.W.2d at 435-36. 
80. Id. ¶ 29, 865 N.W.2d at 441. 
81. Id. ¶ 6, 865 N.W.2d at 436. 
82. Id. ¶ 3, 865 N.W.2d at 435-36. 
83. Id. ¶ 4, 865 N.W.2d at 436. 
84. Id. ¶ 5. 
85. Id. ¶ 8, 865 N.W.2d at 437 (citing N.D. ADMIN. CODE 75-02-04.1-02(9) (2015)).  
86. Id.  
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found that under this statute child support is appropriate for the case at 
hand.87 
On appeal, Bradley first argues that Brenda should not be considered 
the primary caregiver.88  North Dakota legislation directs the court to 
consider the primary caregiver as the parent who acts as such more often 
than the other parent.89  The court noted Boumont v. Boumont,90 which held 
that “the divorce judgment’s language controlled regardless of the parties’ 
actual practices.”91  This was done to promote a bright line rule.92  
Therefore, because the divorce judgment gave Brenda primary residential 
responsibility of the parties’ children, the supreme court concluded the 
district court correctly followed the divorce decree.93 
Secondly, Bradley claims that his child support obligation should be 
offset by the benefits that C.B.S. receives from Medicaid and Supplemental 
Security Income.94  He relied on N.D. Administrative Code section 75-02-
04.1-02(11), which provides “[a] payment of children’s benefits made to or 
on behalf of a child who is not living with the obligor must be credited as a 
payment toward the obligor’s child support obligation.”95  He noted that 
these benefits include those resulting from the parent-child relationship but 
do not include payments from “public assistance programs that are means 
tested.”96  Bradley argued that the benefits C.B.S. receives are not “means 
tested”97 but are a derivative of the parent-child relationship.98  However, 
since he raised the issue for the first time on appeal, the court waived the 
claim.99 
The court followed Norberg v. Norberg,100 which held that child 
support obligations would not be offset by benefits that are not attributable 
to the obligor.101  The court found no evidence that C.B.S.’s benefits were 
 
87. Id. 
88. Id. ¶ 6, 865 N.W.2d at 436. 
89. A parent will be considered to have primary residential responsibility if he or she “acts as 
the primary caregiver on a regular basis for a proportion of time greater than the obligor.” N.D. 
ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-04.1-01(9) (2015).  
90. 2005 ND 20, 691 N.W.2d 278. 
91. Schiele, ¶ 12, 865 N.W.2d at 438. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. ¶ 13. 
94. Id. ¶ 14. 
95. Id. ¶ 8, 865 N.W.2d at 437. 
96. Id. (citing N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-04.1-01(3) (2015)). 
97. The court defines means tested as benefits that are unrelated to income.  Id. ¶ 18, 865 
N.W.2d at 439. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. ¶ 16, 865 N.W.2d at 439. 
100. 2014 ND 90, 845 N.W.2d 348. 
101. Schiele, ¶ 17, 865 N.W.2d at 439. 
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attributable to Bradley.102 Therefore, it affirmed the district court decision 
that Bradley’s child support obligation will not be offset by the benefits 
C.B.S. receives.103 
Justice McEvers concurred with the majority because the district court 
correctly followed the law, although the justice agreed with the logic of the 
dissent.104  McEvers noted that the presumption that the amount of child 
support is correct may be rebutted if the party can show that the child 
support agency’s criteria prove that the amount is incorrect.105  However, 
Justice McEvers states that none of the child support agency criteria apply 
to the facts of this case.106  Justice McEvers also noted that Bergman v. 
Bergman107 cannot be followed because the guiding authority has changed 
since the case was decided.108  The North Dakota legislature narrowed the 
criteria for rebutting the presumptive amount, making it exclusive.109  
McEvers determined the change of law to be a clear indication that North 
Dakota intended the rebuttable presumption to be narrow.110  As a result, 
the rebuttable presumption cannot be applied to the case at hand.111 
Justice Sandstrom dissented from the majority.112  Justice Sandstrom 
finds a rebuttable presumption appropriate because “neither parent is in fact 
supporting the child.”113  Sandstrom noted that the child support guidelines 
“assume that one parent acts as a primary caregiver.”114  Since that is not 
the case here, Sandstrom found the result to be incorrect.115  Further, 
Sandstrom noted that above all, the interpretation of the statutes must be 
reasonable.116  The justice found it unreasonable to require a parent to pay 
$2,053 in child support when the recipient is paying $200–$300 in actual 




103. Id. ¶ 19 
104. Id. ¶ 22, 865 N.W.2d at 440 (McEvers, J., concurring). 
105. Id. ¶ 23 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-09.7(4) (2013)).  
106. Id.  
107. 486 N.W.2d 243 (N.D. 1992). 




112. Id. ¶ 27, 865 N.W.2d at 441 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting). 
113. Id. ¶ 31. 
114. Id. ¶ 33, 865 N.W.2d at 442 (citing N.D. ADMIN. CODE 75-02-04.1-02(1) (2015)). 
115. Id. 
116. Id. ¶ 34 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-11-05(33) (2013)). 
117. Id. ¶¶ 28-29, 865 N.W.2d at 441.   
118. Id. ¶ 34, 865 N.W.2d at 442. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—AUTOMOBILES—SEARCHES AND 
SEIZURES 
 State v. Birchfield 
 
In State v. Birchfield,119 Danny Birchfield appealed from a criminal 
judgment for refusing to submit to a chemical test to determine the alcohol 
concentration in his blood.120  Birchfield argued on appeal that North 
Dakota’s criminal refusal statute is unconstitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment and article 1, section 8 of the North Dakota Constitution.121  
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court criminal 
judgment, finding that the criminal refusal statute does not violate rights 
under the Fourth Amendment or the North Dakota Constitution.122 
Challenges of constitutionality are fully reviewable on appeal.123  All 
enacted statutes are presumed to be constitutional, requiring that the 
challenging party must clearly demonstrate that the statute contravenes the 
constitution.124  This strong presumption requires the invalidity of the 
statute to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the challenging party.125  
The statute that Birchfield challenged was the criminal refusal provision 
which states, “A person may not drive . . . if . . . that individual refuses to 
submit to a chemical test . . . to determine the alcohol concentration . . . in 
the individual’s blood, breath, or urine.”126 
The court recognized that driving is not a constitutional right and may 
be “subject to reasonable control by the State under its police power.”127  
The chemical test to which Birchfield refused may only be administered 
after the individual is arrested.128  A person may refuse the chemical testing, 
but refusal is “a crime punishable in the same manner as driving under the 
influence.”129  Chemical tests to determine a person’s blood alcohol 
concentration are considered searches for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment, which protects the individual from unreasonable searches and 
seizures.130 
 
119. 2015 ND 6, 858 N.W.2d 302. 
120. Birchfield, ¶ 1, 858 N.W.2d at 303. 
121. Id. ¶ 3. 
122. Id. ¶ 1. 
123. Id. ¶ 5. 
124. Id. ¶ 5, 858 N.W.2d at 303-04. 
125. Id. at 304. 
126. Id. ¶ 7. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01 (2013)). 
127. Id. ¶ 6. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. ¶ 7 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-01 (2013)). 
130. Id. ¶ 8. 
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The court cited Missouri v. McNeely,131 which held that the dissipation 
of alcohol in the bloodstream would not justify a per se warrantless blood 
test.132  The decision was based in part on the fact that all fifty states have 
adopted implied consent laws that allow for evidence to be secured without 
a warrantless search.133  The North Dakota Supreme Court subsequently 
held that the implied consent laws do not coerce or render consent 
involuntary since the individual is presented with a choice.134 
Based on these findings, the court noted that the statute must be 
reasonable to maintain its validity.135  It was a question of first impression 
in North Dakota if the criminal refusal statute violates the Fourth 
Amendment.136  Birchfield cited no case that struck down criminal refusal 
statutes.137  In fact, the court found that the statutes have survived Fourth 
Amendment challenges in other states.138 
The court determined the reasonableness of the Fourth Amendment 
infringement by “balancing the promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests with the intrusion on an individual’s privacy.”139  It found the 
governmental interest to be compelling since decreasing drunk driving is a 
valid public concern.140  Further, the intrusion upon the individual’s privacy 
is minimal based on the driver’s lowered expectation of privacy when 
driving a vehicle.141  Also, the court acknowledged that the driver may 
avoid “enhanced penalties for being highly intoxicated” if he or she chooses 
to refuse to the chemical testing.142  The court found this analysis sufficient 
to prove that the criminal refusal statutes were reasonable and therefore 
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment and article 1, section 8 of the 
North Dakota Constitution.143 
 
131. 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013). 
132. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1568. 
133. Birchfield, ¶ 10, 858 N.W.2d at 306.  
134. Id. ¶ 11. 
135. Id. 
136. Id.  
137. Id. ¶ 12. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. ¶ 17, 858 N.W.2d at 309. 
140. Id. 
141. Id.  
142. Id. 
143. Id. ¶ 19, 858 N.W.2d at 310.  At the time of writing, this case, along with Beylund v. 
Levi and a Minnesota companion case, was on appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States 
with it being argued that these statutes were unconstitutional.  U.S. Supreme Court Hearing N.D. 
Cases on April 20, N.D. SUP. CT., http://www ndcourts.gov/court/news/USSupremeCourtND 
2016 htm. 
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LANDLORD AND TENANT—CONTRACTS—ESTOPPEL 
 Savre v. Santoyo 
 
In Savre v. Santoyo,144 Savre leased two parcels of land from Santoyo 
for the purpose of running his auto repair business.145  The lease was signed 
on June 15, 2008, for a two-year term with a mid-lease rent increase.146 
Around the time of the rent increase, the parties entered into a “Lease to 
Purchase Option Agreement,” which would allow Savre to lease the two 
parcels for a period of time and then purchase the property if certain 
conditions were met.147  The agreement, signed July 15, 2009, specified the 
option term, a notice requirement, a purchase price, an exclusivity of option 
clause, a financing disclaimer, remedies upon default, and a modification 
clause.148  The lease stated that monthly rent payments were due on the first 
of each month, but Savre was frequently late.149  Santoyo accepted the late 
payments and did not indicate to Savre in writing any intent to terminate the 
lease on that basis.150 
In preparation for purchasing the property, Savre set up JDDS, LLC, to 
use as a financing entity; however, Savre did not attempt to assign, convey, 
delegate, or transfer the purchase option to JDDS.151  Savre gave notice to 
Santoyo of his intent to purchase the property on December 21, 2012, and 
February 27, 2013, with no response from Santoyo.152  After Santoyo 
refused to sell him the property, Savre stopped making monthly payments, 
and Santoyo initiated eviction proceedings.153  The district court granted the 
eviction, entering judgment against Savre for unpaid rent and Santoyo’s 
costs and disbursements.154  By the end of June 2013, Savre vacated the 
property, began leasing from someone else, and brought this lawsuit against 
Santoyo.155  Savre argues that Santoyo was unjustly enriched by breaking 
the option agreement, but Santoyo denied the allegations and 
counterclaimed for damages to the property upon eviction.156  The district 
court found Santoyo breached the option purchase agreement, awarding 
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Savre $31,996 in damages for overpayments under the lease agreement but 
denied any additional lost profits damages.157  The court also dismissed 
Santoyo’s counterclaim for failing to meet his burden of proof.158 
General contract rules also apply to leases.  Therefore, the goal of 
contract interpretation is to determine the parties’ intent, from the written 
language alone if possible.159  The appellate court independently examines 
the contract, but whether a party has breached is a finding of fact subject to 
the clearly erroneous standard.160  A breach occurs when there is 
nonperformance of a contractual duty when it is due.161 
First, Santoyo argues that the district court should not have concluded 
Santoyo had a duty to sell to a third party with no rights and not even in 
existence at the time of the agreement.162  Alternatively, Santoyo states that 
neither Savre nor JDDS ever had sufficient financing to complete the 
transaction.163  The court disagreed, however, finding that it was Savre 
alone who paid extra payments under the lease and exercised the purchase 
option in December 2012 and February 2013.164  Since the agreement did 
not require financing to be in place for Savre to finalize the purchase, Savre 
had completely performed under the contract until Santoyo failed to 
respond in any way to Savre’s notice.165  Since Savre exercised the option 
and made no effort to transfer or convey the option to JDDS, Savre fully 
performed, and the district court did not err in finding Santoyo’s lack of 
response as a breach of the agreement.166 
Second, Santoyo argues that the district court was incorrect in finding 
that he had waived strict compliance to the option agreement’s terms by his 
conduct even though the agreement required any waiver to be in writing.167 
Normally, strict compliance is required for purchase option contracts, but a 
waiver of contractual rights is possible.168  A waiver can be established by 
either express agreement or via inference from acts or conduct, such as an 
unexplained delay in enforcing contractual rights or accepting performance 
different than expected under the contract.169  The court looked to Corbin 
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on Contracts section 40 to note that in option contracts, a requirement for 
timely payments may be waived by acceptance of a delayed payment 
without any further action.170  This waiver may operate even in the presence 
of a non-waiver provision in the contract.171  Since Santoyo accepted the 
increased rent payments, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the 
district court did not err in finding that Santoyo had waived strict 
compliance with the option agreement.172 
Lastly, Santoyo argues that the district court failed to make sufficient 
findings of fact when it dismissed his counterclaim for damages to the 
property.173  Under Rule 52(a)(1) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a district court making findings of fact without a jury must state 
conclusions of fact and law separately to allow the appellate court to 
understand the ruling.174  Santoyo contends that a tremendous amount of 
photographs and other evidence of the damage were introduced at trial and 
that Savre himself agrees that some of the damage was caused by him.175 
The supreme court agreed with Santoyo that the district court should have 
provided a better factual basis for its ruling.176  Specifically, the court’s 
opinion noted that Savre himself agreed with some of the damages, and 
therefore, the district court’s findings of fact dismissing the counterclaim do 
not sufficiently address it.177  Therefore, the court reversed as to this part 
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CONTRACTS LAW—REMEDIES—AMOUNT OF DAMAGES 
 Peterbilt of Fargo, Inc. v. Red River Trucking, LLC 
 
In Peterbilt of Fargo, Inc. v. Red River Trucking, LLC,179 Red River 
Trucking (“Red River”) brought a totaled truck to Peterbilt of Fargo 
(“Peterbilt”) for repairs.180  Red River’s insurance company paid out the 
value of the truck at $22,500, but Red River decided to keep the truck with 
a salvaged title and repair it for $37,505.65 in cash upon completion.181 
Although Peterbilt began repairing the truck, Peterbilt stopped repairs on 
March 23, 2011, after Red River failed to pay a Peterbilt affiliate, Allstate 
Peterbilt group, and due to the relative cost of the repairs compared with the 
value of the truck.182  Peterbilt already had put $31,346.65 in repairs into 
the truck, which was supposed to be completed by May 1, 2011.183  
Peterbilt told Red River in March 2011 that no more repairs would be 
completed until Red River paid half of the estimated repairs.184  Peterbilt 
also offered to release the truck upon payment of repairs made through that 
date.185  Red River declined to follow either option, and Peterbilt retained 
possession of the truck.186 
Peterbilt sued Red River for the value of the completed repairs under a 
repairman’s lien.187  Red River denied Peterbilt had a valid lien and 
counterclaimed for lost profits alleging Peterbilt breached the repair 
contract.188  Peterbilt replied, saying that Red River failed to mitigate its 
damages.189  The district court found that Peterbilt had a valid repairman’s 
lien that entitled them to $31,346.65, which they could foreclose on via the 
sale of the truck.190  However, the district court also found that Peterbilt 
breached the repair contract when the truck was not repaired by May 1, 
2011.191  The court also concluded that Red River failed to mitigate its 
damages for the breach since Red River had another truck available which 
could have been repaired.192  Therefore, the district court dismissed all of 
 
179. 2015 ND 140, 864 N.W.2d 276. 
180. Peterbilt of Fargo, ¶ 2, 864 N.W.2d 278. 
181. Id.  
182. Id. ¶ 3. 
183. Id. ¶¶ 2-3, 864 N.W.2d at 278-79. 
184. Id. ¶ 3, 864 N.W.2d at 279. 
185. Id.  
186. Id. 
187. Id. ¶ 4. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. ¶ 5. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
          
2015] NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW 453 
Red River’s $201,564 in claims of lost profits except for $390.66, which the 
court found was caused by the two-month delay from Peterbilt’s breach of 
contract.193 
Red River moved to amend the ruling, arguing that the damages should 
have been $39,042.63 instead of $390.66, but the motion was denied.194  On 
May 9, 2014, Peterbilt submitted a proposed amended judgment of 
$34,842.21 due to the remaining necessary repairs plus costs, which the 
district court entered on May 13, 2014, and served on Red River on May 
14, 2014.195  Red River appealed on July 7, 2014, and the truck was sold at 
a sheriff’s sale on July 15, 2014.196 
The Supreme Court of North Dakota first examined whether Red 
River’s appeal was timely or moot.197  First, the court notes that the appeal 
was timely because it was within sixty days of the May 14, 2014, notice of 
entry of the amended judgment.198  The court considered Peterbilt’s request 
to amend the judgment as a timely motion under the North Dakota Rule of 
Civil Procedure 59, and therefore Red River had a full sixty days from the 
time when it was served with notice of the entry of the amended 
judgment.199  Second, the court determined that Red River’s appeal is not 
moot due to the sheriff’s sale of the truck because the fundamental issue in 
their appeal is the amount of damages, not the status of the truck.200 
Next, the supreme court examined whether the district court properly 
measured the damages.201  In North Dakota, section 32-03-09 of the 
Century Code describes the measure of damages for a breach of contract as 
“the amount which will compensate the party aggrieved for all the 
detriment proximately caused thereby or which in the ordinary course of 
things would be likely to result therefrom.”202  The damages must be clearly 
ascertainable in both their nature and origin.203  Furthermore, an injured 
party has a duty to mitigate the damages if he can do so with reasonable 
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exertion or trifling expense and can only recover damages for things which 
he could not have avoided with reasonable effort.204 
First, Red River’s attempts to argue that Peterbilt had the burden to 
show Red River did not mitigate its damages.205  Additionally, Red River 
argues that it should be presumptively reasonable for the nonbreaching 
party to refuse to deal with the breaching party.206  The court dismissed 
these claims as being new issues brought only on appeal. 207 
Second, the court reviews whether enough evidence exists to show that 
Red River failed to mitigate its damages, finding that the district court did 
not err by holding that Red River could have taken reasonable efforts to 
repair one of its two trucks in July 2011.208  Red River received a check for 
$41,000 in July 2011, which could have been used to repair a truck at that 
time, but instead Red River made the business decision to let the truck sit 
idle until February 2013.209  Since Red River could reasonably have used 
the money to repair the truck in July 2011, damages after that time are not 
appropriate.210 
Lastly, Red River argues that the district court erroneously based the 
lost profits calculation on one year of maintenance costs rather than a three-
year average.211  The court declined the invitation to reweigh the evidence 
after finding that the district court’s damages calculation was within the 
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CRIMINAL LAW—EVIDENCE—HEARSAY IN GENERAL 
 State v. Guttormson 
 
In State v. Guttormson,213 Guttormson argued that his Sixth 
Amendment right of confrontation had been violated after a jury found him 
guilty of refusing to submit to an onsite screening test.214  The arresting 
officer did not testify at Guttormson’s trial, but another officer on the scene 
testified instead as to the arresting officer’s actions.215 
Specifically, Guttormson first argues that an arresting officer for a 
crime of refusal to submit to an onsite screening test must have formed an 
opinion that the defendant’s body contained alcohol.216  Guttormson 
believes that if the jury is allowed to infer the police officer’s opinion 
through circumstantial evidence, his Sixth Amendment right of 
confrontation had been violated.217  Secondly, Guttormson suggests, similar 
to the blood alcohol analyst in Bullcoming v. New Mexico,218 that the 
admission of the officer’s squad car video and the non-arresting officer’s 
testimony with regard to the implied consent advisory violates his Sixth 
Amendment right of confrontation.219 
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment states that the 
accused in criminal prosecutions shall enjoy the right to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him.220  The Confrontation Clause prohibits 
testimonial hearsay, a specific type of statement offered to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted.221  If a statement is offered to show that it was 
spoken, it is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted and cannot be 
hearsay.222  A testimonial statement has not been specifically defined by the 
United States Supreme Court but arises in ex parte in-court testimony, 
extrajudicial statements made in formalized materials, and “statements that 
were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness 
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later 
trial.”223 
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Justice Sandstrom’s majority opinion notes that the non-arresting 
officer’s testimony regarding the arresting officer’s recitation of the implied 
consent advisory and the breath test request were only introduced to verify 
that the verbal act occurred.224  The evidence that the advisory was given 
was not offered to prove as true the statements within the advisory.225 
Guttormson’s second argument that the silent video and non-arresting 
officer’s testimony constitute surrogate evidence forbidden by Bullcoming 
was also rejected by the court.226  In Bullcoming, a forensic report analyst, 
familiar with the testing process, testified in place of the actual analyst who 
had tested the defendant’s blood in a felony DUI case.227  The North Dakota 
Supreme Court distinguished Bullcoming because Guttormson’s situation 
involved a police officer who had participated and observed in all relevant 
portions of the encounter.228  Furthermore, the court notes that the silent 
squad car video is not testimonial in nature because it is not intended as an 
assertive statement.229  To be a statement, nonverbal conduct must be 
intended as an assertion, and nonassertive conduct is not a statement and 
therefore not hearsay.230  Instead, the arresting officer’s actions in the video, 
such as activating the overhead lights, pointing across the street, gesturing 
toward the defendant, and arresting Guttormson, were offered as 
circumstantial evidence of the arresting officer’s opinion and conduct.231 
Lastly, Guttormson argued that the evidence was not sufficient to 
support a conviction for a refusal to submit to an onsite screening test 
because the arresting officer’s opinion could not be inferred from the 
circumstantial evidence.232  In affirming the district court opinion that 
sufficient evidence existed, the Supreme Court of North Dakota pointed to 
the fact that the silent video showed the defendant’s car driving on the 
center line immediately preceding the stop.233  Furthermore, the non-
arresting officer’s testimony as to the defendant’s poor balance, swaying, 
and difficulty in standing allowed the jury to infer the presence of a traffic 
violation and alcohol consumption via circumstantial evidence.234  Since the 
supreme court rejected all of Guttormson’s arguments, the court found that 
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Guttormson’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation was not violated and 
sufficient evidence existed to convict him.235 
Chief Justice VandeWalle and Justice McEvers each concurred 
specially with the decision in this case.  The Chief Justice noted that he 
“believe[s] it is injudicious to not call the arresting officer as a witness . . . 
if that officer is available.”236  In cases similar to this, a significant risk 
exists that the non-arresting officer on the witness stand will be asked a 
question for which the answer would violate the Confrontation Clause.237  
The case will be likely to either fail on appeal if the question is answered or 
fail in the district court if the objection is sustained.238 
Justice McEvers, on the other hand, disagreed with the Chief Justice’s 
characterization of not calling the arresting officer as a witness as 
“injudicious.”239  Instead, Justice McEvers emphasized prosecutorial 
discretion in selecting witnesses.240  Additionally, the justice was concerned 
about the case’s jury instructions, which required a showing of the reason 
for the stop and that the officer formed an opinion that the defendant’s body 
contains alcohol.241  Since section 39-08-01 of the Century Code, the 
driving under the influence statute, does not make the lawfulness of the stop 
an element of the crime, the lawfulness of the stop should not be an element 
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CRIMINAL LAW—SEARCHES AND SEIZURES—PLAIN VIEW 
 State v. Zacher 
 
In State v. Zacher,243 Brett Zacher appealed from a district court order 
denying his motion to suppress evidence and a criminal judgment entered 
after a conditional guilty plea for being in possession of a controlled 
substance.244  A Mandan police officer saw Zacher fail to stop at a sign on 
April 6, 2014.245  The officer stopped Zacher after discovering that Zacher 
had a suspended license.246   
After arresting Zacher for driving under suspension and placing him in 
the police vehicle, the officer informed Zacher of his Miranda rights and 
offered to move Zacher’s vehicle so that it would not be towed.247  Zacher 
gave the officer permission to move his car from the parking lot, and as the 
officer was moving it, he noticed the top portion of a small plastic bag 
between the driver’s seat and middle console.248  The officer could not see 
or identify the contents of the bag but was suspicious of it based on his 
experience.249  The officer removed the bag and discovered it contained 
“very small pieces of paper.”250  The officer was unable to identify the 
contents, but another officer at the scene believed it contained LSD.251  
When asked, Zacher stated the contents were fake acid, but upon inspection 
at the police station, the officer confirmed that the bag contained LSD.252  
When confronted, Zacher confirmed the LSD was real.253  Zacher was 
charged with possession of a controlled substance for which he 
conditionally pled guilty after the district court denied his motion to 
suppress.254 
Zacher argues the plain view doctrine does not apply and the bag 
should not have been seized without a warrant.255  When reviewing a ruling 
on a motion to suppress, the North Dakota Supreme Court defers to the 
district court’s findings of fact and resolves any conflicts in testimony in 
favor of affirmance; the court will affirm if “there is sufficient competent 
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evidence fairly capable of supporting the court’s findings, and the decision 
is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.”256 
Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
unreasonable searches and seizures are prohibited, and a strong preference 
for law enforcement officers to obtain warrants exists.257  A warrantless 
search is not permissible, and any evidence obtained without a warrant must 
be suppressed unless a recognized exception applies.258  The defendant has 
the initial burden to show the evidence should be suppressed, but the burden 
shifts to the state to show a recognized exception applies.259 
The plain view exception states that “police officers may seize a clearly 
incriminating object without a warrant if the officers are lawfully in a 
position from which they view an object and the object’s incriminating 
character is immediately apparent.”260  If contraband is left in open view 
from a lawful vantage point of a police officer, no expectation of privacy 
exists, and therefore no search as occurred.261  Since the officer in this case 
had permission to enter the vehicle, the officer was in a lawful vantage 
point.262  Therefore, the only remaining prong of the plain view exception is 
the question of whether the incriminating nature of the plastic bag was 
immediately apparent.263 
Zacher argues that the incriminating nature was not immediately 
apparent because the contents were not visible to the officer until he 
removed it, a fact confirmed by the officer in testimony.264  The State 
argues that officers do not need a “high degree of certainty as to the 
incriminating character of evidence” but instead only need probable cause 
to believe it is connected with criminal activity.265 
The Supreme Court of North Dakota ultimately agreed with Zacher, 
finding that under State v. Nickel,266 the object must not only be in plain 
view, but its incriminating character must also be immediately apparent.267 
Even if the object is in plain view, it may be subject to a search requiring 
probable cause if the object or area where it is located bears no relationship 
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to the reason for the police presence there.268  In this case, since the officer 
was unable to identify the contents of the plastic bag before removing it and 
was even unable to identify the illegality of the contents after removing it, 
the warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment.269  The court 
reversed the criminal judgment and held that the district court erred in 
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CRIMINAL LAW—SEARCHES AND SEIZURES—WARRANTLESS 
SEARCH 
 State v. Williams 
 
In State v. Williams,271 Williams sought review of a criminal judgment 
after he conditionally pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana with intent 
to deliver and drug paraphernalia.272  Williams alleged the use of a drug-
sniffing dog in a privately owned condominium hallway is a warrantless 
and illegal search of the condominium’s curtilage.273  The North Dakota 
Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the non-exclusive nature of the 
hallway pushed the area outside of the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment.274 
The Fargo Police Department, acting on intelligence that marijuana 
was being sold out of Williams’s residence, brought a drug-sniffing dog to 
investigate.275  Williams lived in a four-plex condominium building 
surrounded by a fence with an open gate, and his individual residence 
opened into a hallway that could be accessed from outside the building via 
an unsecured common door.276  The dog entered the hallway, sniffing the 
two doors present, but only alerted to the door to Williams’s residence.277  
The dog handler testified that he could smell burnt marijuana upon entering 
the hallway.278  The officers returned with a warrant to search the premises, 
leading to drug charges against Williams.279  Williams conditionally pled 
guilty to both charges, but reserved the right to appeal after the court 
refused to suppress the evidence.280 
In its decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court noted that the Fourth 
Amendment protects a home’s curtilage from unreasonable searches and 
seizures.281  The court defined curtilage as the “area near a dwelling, not 
necessarily enclosed, that generally includes buildings or other adjuncts 
used for domestic purposes.”282  The United States Supreme Court case 
United States v. Dunn283 outlines the factors to consider when determining 
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whether a particular area is a part of a home’s curtilage.284  The factors 
include the proximity of the home to the area, whether it is within an 
enclosure surrounding the home, how the space is used, and any steps taken 
to protect the area from observation by those passing by.285  These factors 
are not meant to be mechanically applied but answer whether the area in 
question is “so intimately tied to the home itself” that it should be protected 
from unreasonable searches and seizures.286  However, the court noted that 
the concept of curtilage is significantly modified when applied to a multi-
family dwelling and proceeded to conduct a privacy analysis instead of 
relying strictly on the Dunn factors.287 
If an expectation of privacy exists, the government must obtain a 
warrant before searching unless an exception applies.288  A reasonable 
expectation of privacy occurs when the individual exhibits an actual, 
subjective expectation of privacy, and society recognizes that expectation as 
reasonable.289  Reasonableness depends on whether the individual has a 
possessory interest in the searched location, whether the interest is 
exclusory, whether the individual takes precautions to maintain privacy, and 
whether the individual has a key.290 
Williams argued that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
condominium hallway due to his possessory interest as a tenant in common 
with the other condominium owners, the presence of a fence around the 
property with the mailboxes outside the fence, and the placement of a plant 
in the hallway’s window to limit visibility.291  In particular, Williams relied 
on Florida v. Jardines,292 a case in which the police conducted a dog sniff 
search of the front porch of a defendant’s home.293  The United States 
Supreme Court found that the front porch in Jardines was a classic example 
of curtilage based on property rights and declared the search invalid.294 
The North Dakota Supreme Court looked to State v. Nguyen295 for its 
privacy analysis, finding that a search does not occur unless the right to 
privacy is violated.296  In Nguyen, North Dakota’s highest court held that no 
 
284. Williams, ¶ 9, 862 N.W.2d at 833-34.  
285. Id.  
286. Id. at 834. 
287. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. 
288. Id. ¶ 14, 862 N.W.2d at 834-35. 
289. Id. at 835. 
290. Id. 
291. Id. ¶ 15. 
292. 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013). 
293. Williams, ¶ 18, 862 N.W.2d at 835. 
294. Id. 
295. 2013 ND 252, 841 N.W.2d 676. 
296. Williams, ¶ 14, 862 N.W.2d at 834. 
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expectation of privacy existed in the common hallway of a secured 
apartment building.297  The Nguyen opinion distinguished Jardines because 
Jardines relied on the traditional consideration of a porch as curtilage.298 
Ultimately, the court found Williams’s property interest in the hallway 
non-exclusive.299  The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has not directly 
applied Jardines since it was decided, and other courts have reached 
differing conclusions.300  The North Dakota Supreme Court found that 
Williams’s condominium building looked and functioned very similarly to 
an apartment building, such as in Nguyen, as opposed to a single-family 
dwelling such as in Jardines.301  The court declined to overturn Nguyen and 
held that an individual’s expectation of privacy is diminished in the 
common areas of a multi-family dwelling.302  With a finding that the 
common hallway of the condominium was outside the curtilage of 
Williams’s home and that Williams did not have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in that area, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of the 

















297. Id. ¶ 16, 862 N.W.2d at 835. 
298. Id. ¶ 21, 862 N.W.2d at 837. 
299. Id. ¶ 17, 862 N.W.2d at 835. 
300. Id. ¶ 19, 862 N.W.2d at 836. 
301. Id. ¶ 23, 862 N.W.2d at 837. 
302. Id. ¶ 17, 862 N.W.2d at 835. 
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CRIMINAL LAW—STATUTES—PROSTITUTION 
 State v. Rufus 
 
In State v. Rufus,304 Galen Rufus appealed a criminal judgment that 
found him guilty of human trafficking.305  His appeal challenged the 
sufficiency of evidence and the classification of his offense as a AA 
felony.306  The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with the district court 
findings and affirmed Rufus’s conviction for human trafficking based on 
sufficient evidence.307 
Rufus responded to a Craigslist advertisement under “personal > casual 
encounters” posted by “Chad Russo,” persona for a Ward County Deputy 
Sheriff.308  The advertisement stated that Russo’s girlfriend “would be out 
of town for the weekend” and her daughter “wanted to make some money 
while her mother was gone.”309  During two Yahoo Messenger 
conversations, Russo disclosed to Rufus the girl was fourteen years old.310 
When Rufus asked if that was illegal, Russo acknowledged that fourteen 
was illegal but assured Rufus that he would keep it confidential.311  Russo 
sent Rufus a fictitious picture of his girlfriend’s alleged fourteen-year-old 
daughter.312  The two men discussed pricing for specific sex acts, location, 
and time to meet.313  They agreed to meet at 9 p.m. in a parking lot; Russo 
would bring the girl, and Rufus would bring two bags of marijuana in 
exchange for one hour with the girl.314  Russo told Rufus to bring condoms 
if he wanted to have sex with the girl.315 
When Rufus arrived at the agreed upon parking lot, he was arrested.316  
His vehicle contained marijuana, money, a cooler containing beer, one 
morphine pill, and one oxycodone pill.317  Rufus was charged with human 
trafficking.318  He waived his right to a jury trial.319  In May 2014, at a 
bench trial, he was convicted of human trafficking, a class AA felony.320 
 
304. 2015 ND 212, 868 N.W.2d 534. 
305. Rufus, ¶ 1, 868 N.W.2d at 536. 
306. Id. ¶ 3, 868 N.W.2d at 537. 
307. Id. ¶ 1, 868 N.W.2d at 536. 
308. Id. ¶ 2, 868 N.W.2d at 536-37. 
309. Id. at 537. 
310. Id.  
311. Id.  
312. Id.  
313. Id.  
314. Id.  
315. Id.  
316. Id.  
317. Id.  
318. Id. ¶ 3. 
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On appeal, Rufus argued that the evidence in his case was insufficient 
for the district court to find that he committed the crime of human 
trafficking.321  To support this position, Rufus made four arguments.322  
First, he argued the court should review the facts and law of his case on a de 
novo standard.323  Second, he contended the district court’s findings were 
flawed.324  Third, he claimed his actions did not meet the elements of 
human trafficking.325  Fourth, he argued his actions also did not constitute 
an attempt to commit a crime.326 
Addressing his first argument on the standard on which his appeal 
should be reviewed, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated their standard 
of review “does not vary depending on how much evidence in the form of 
testimony was presented to the district court, and we are not persuaded to 
adopt such an inconsistent, variable standard.”327  Rufus argued the de novo 
standard was appropriate because the court had available “all of the 
evidence in the record that was available to the district court.”328  The court 
disagreed and did not review the case de novo.329 
Next, Rufus argued that the evidence did not support the district court 
findings.330  Specifically, Rufus stated that he did not suggest trading 
marijuana for sexual services.331  In his view, Russo made the suggestion.332 
Rufus also focused on the lack of condoms in his vehicle.333  Russo told 
him to bring condoms if he wanted to have sex, and Rufus claims that the 
lack of condoms showed his lack of intent to have intercourse.334  In 
response to this argument, the court relied on State v. Steiger335 and State v. 
 
319. Id. 
320. Id.  
321. Id. ¶ 4. 
322. Id.  
323. Id.  
324. Id.  
325. Id.  
326. Id.  
327. Id. ¶ 7, 868 N.W.2d at 538. 
328. Id. ¶ 5, 868 N.W.2d at 537. 
329. Id. ¶¶ 6-7, 868 N.W.2d at 538. 
330. Id. ¶ 8. 
331. Id.  
332. Id.  
333. Id. 
334. Id.  
335. 2002 ND 79, 644 N.W.2d 187.  “Accordingly, this Court is not limited to the reasons a 
trial court gives for a finding of guilt.  Instead, we consider the entire record to decide whether 
substantial evidence exists to support the conviction.”  Steiger, ¶ 8, 644 N.W.2d at 190. 
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Corman.336  In criminal cases, the court does not have to consider if the 
district court findings are flawed because the court can review the entire 
record; thus, they dismissed this argument as well.337 
In support of his third argument, Rufus made three claims of 
insufficient evidence to support his conviction.338  He specifically argued 
that his actions of “making a date with a pimp to possibly have sex with an 
underage prostitute” did not support the elements of the crime of human 
trafficking.339  Rufus claimed there was also insufficient evidence to show 
that he would have caused the girl to have sex with him.340  Lastly, he 
argued the evidence was insufficient in regards to showing he had 
“completed a substantial step toward committing the crime of human 
trafficking or that he had the requisite intent to do so.”341 
To address the elements of human trafficking argument, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court relied on statutory interpretation principles.342  The 
court has the authority to review statutes on appeal because it is a question 
of law.343  The statutes at issue in this appeal were section 12.1-40-01(1)344 
and section 12.1-40-03(3), (5).345  The district court found Rufus guilty of 
human trafficking because he “bargained with another adult for the sexual 
services of a fourteen-year-old girl, agreeing to exchange a quantity of 
marijuana for an hour with the . . . girl.”346   
The evidence showed that Rufus knew the girl’s age and because 
sexual activities and prices were discussed, “he was purchasing her for 
sexual activity.”347  The district court further found that Rufus knew what 
he was doing was illegal and that he had taken a “substantial step toward 
attempting the crime of human trafficking” when he showed up at the 
parking lot with the agreed upon items.348  Accordingly, the district court 
applied Century Code section 12.1-40-01(1)(b) to both the purchaser and 
 
336. 2009 ND 85, 765 N.W.2d 530.  “[W]e look to the evidence and reasonable inferences 
most favorable to the verdict to ascertain whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant a 
conviction.”  Corman, ¶ 8, 765 N.W.2d at 533. 
337. Rufus, ¶ 10, 868 N.W.2d at 539. 
338. Id. ¶ 11. 
339. Id.  
340. Id.  
341. Id.  
342. Id. ¶ 12, 868 N.W.2d at 539-40. 
343. State v. Brossart, 2015 ND 1, ¶ 23, 858 N.W.2d 275, 285. 
344. N.D.CENT. CODE § 12.1-40-01(1) (2013) (providing when a person is guilty of human 
trafficking). 
345. N.D.CENT. CODE § 12.1-40-03(3), (5) (2013) (defining human trafficking and sex 
trafficking respectively).  
346. Rufus, ¶ 13, 868 N.W.2d at 540. 
347. Id. 
348. Id. 
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the supplier.349  Rufus’s position was that he attempted to obtain services 
from the girl, not the girl herself, failing to meet the “obtain” portion of 
section 12.1-40-01(1)(b).350 
This case was the first time the North Dakota Supreme Court 
interpreted section 12.1-40-01(1), thus the court turned to federal precedent 
in United States v. Jungers351 for guidance.352  The defendants in Jungers 
had a similar set of facts to Rufus.353  The Eighth Circuit applied 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1591 in Jungers to both suppliers and purchasers of commercial sex.354  
Rufus did not dispute that section 12.1-40-01(1) of the Century Code 
applied to purchasers, but he remained adamant that he had not sought to 
obtain the girl herself.355  Relying on the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning in 
Jungers and accepted definitions of “obtain,” the North Dakota Supreme 
Court disagreed.356 
Rufus’s fourth argument was that he did not attempt to commit a 
crime.357  He relies on the argument that he was charged with the attempt of 
obtaining a girl, not criminal attempt.358  The State argued that there was 
enough evidence to show that Rufus did take a substantial step in 
committing human trafficking, satisfying the statute and the precedent in 
State v. Stensaker359 which Rufus relied on.360  To be guilty of human 
trafficking, the North Dakota Supreme Court said the State had to provide 
evidence that Rufus “(1) acted with the kind of culpability required for 
commission of the crime of human trafficking and (2) intentionally engaged 
in conduct which constitutes a substantial step toward commission of 
human trafficking.”361  The court applied the culpability level of willfully to 
this statute.362   
In applying the statutory meaning of “obtain” to the facts of this case, 
the court held that Rufus did have the requisite intent to commit human 
trafficking by inferring from his initial response to the Craigslist 
 
349. Id. 
350. Id. ¶ 14. 
351. 702 F.3d 1066 (8th Cir. 2013). 
352. Rufus, ¶ 16, 868 N.W.2d at 541. 
353. Id. ¶ 17. 
354. Id. ¶ 18, 868 N.W.2d at 541-42. 
355. Id. ¶ 20, 868 N.W.2d at 542. 
356. Id. at 542-43. 
357. Id. ¶ 21, 868 N.W.2d at 543. 
358. Id. 
359. 2007 ND 6, 725 N.W.2d 883. 
360. Rufus, ¶ 21, 868 N.W.2d at 542. 
361. Id. ¶ 22. 
362. Id.  
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advertisement.363  The court further found downloading Yahoo Messenger, 
bartering over rates, agreeing to the transaction, and appearing at the agreed 
upon location with the agreed upon amount to exchange was sufficient 
evidence to show Rufus “willfully” committed the crime.364  The court also 
found that there was sufficient evidence to show Rufus intentionally 
committed a substantial step towards completing the crime of human 
trafficking.365  Finally, the court concluded that there was sufficient 
evidence to show Rufus knew the girl “would be subject to human 
trafficking by causing the fourteen-year-old girl to engage in sexual acts or 
sexual conduct.”366 
Rufus’s final argument on appeal was for the court to reverse the 
classification of his human trafficking conviction as a class AA felony.367 
Rufus based this argument on the fact that he was never going to victimize 
a real person.368  At the district court, he argued the lack of a real person 
should go to the severity of the charge.369  The North Dakota Supreme 
Court felt bound by what the Legislative Assembly authorized and upheld 
the application of the offense classification authorized by Century Code 
section 12.1-40-01.370  In conclusion, the court found sufficient evidence to 
support Rufus’s conviction of human trafficking for attempting to obtain a 











363. Id. ¶ 23. 
364. Id. at 543-44. 
365. Id. ¶ 24, 868 N.W.2d at 544. 
366. Id. ¶ 27. 
367. Id. ¶ 29, 868 N.W.2d at 544-45. 
368. Id.  
369. Id. at 545. 
370. Id. ¶ 31. 
371. Id. ¶ 32.  Since Rufus was charged, the North Dakota Legislative Assembly repealed 
chapter 12.1-40 of the Century Code and enacted chapter 12.1-41 to address some of the concerns 
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FAMILY LAW—DIVORCE—DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY 
 Feist v. Feist 
 
In Feist v. Feist,372 the North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the 
district court’s division of the parties’ marital estate in the divorce 
judgment.373  Thomas Feist appealed from the district court awarding all of 
the mineral interests to Cheryl Feist.374  Cheryl Feist cross-appealed, 
contending that she should have been awarded attorney fees.375  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the divorce judgment, holding that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion when it divided the estate and 
awarded Cheryl all of the mineral interests.376 
Since marital distribution is treated as a finding of fact, the court would 
reverse the lower court if it found the distribution to be “clearly 
erroneous.”377  North Dakota defines a holding to be clearly erroneous if “is 
induced by an erroneous view of the law, if there is no evidence to support 
it, or if, after reviewing all the evidence, [it is] left with a definite and firm 
conviction a mistake has been made.”378  The division of the marital estate 
must be equitable,379 which is determined by first finding the property’s 
total value.380  The court will value the property as of the date of the trial 
using the Ruff-Fischer guidelines.381 
The court noted that although the factors of the Ruff-Fischer guidelines 
favored neither party, the guidelines allow for discretion in evaluating other 
important circumstances. 382  The court acknowledged van Oosting v. van 
Oosting,383 which held that the property’s origin may be considered when 
dividing the marital estate.384  This factor favors Cheryl because the mineral 
interests were acquired through Cheryl’s inheritance from her parents.385   
 
372. 2015 ND 98, 862 N.W.2d 817, 817. 
373. Feist, ¶ 1, 862 N.W.2d at 819. 
374. Id. 
375. Id.  
376. Id. ¶ 19, 862 N.W.2d at 823. 
377. Id. ¶ 4, 862 N.W.2d at 820. 
378. Id. 
379. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24(1) (2013). 
380. Feist, ¶ 6, 862 N.W.2d at 820. 
381. Id. 
382. Id. ¶ 11, 862 N.W.2d at 821. 
383. 521 N.W.2d 93 (N.D. 1994) 
384. Feist, ¶ 11, 862 N.W.2d at 821. 
385. Id. ¶ 7, 862 N.W.2d at 820. 
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Thomas’s argument on appeal was that the mineral interests may not be 
solely awarded to Cheryl because their valuation is too speculative.386  He 
urged that the division of the marital estate would only be equitable if he 
received half of the future royalty payments from the mineral interests.387  
Thomas supported his contention with Cheryl’s expert testimony, which 
noted that the valuation of future pricing is “subject to unknown and 
unpredictable market forces which cannot be determined with any level of 
certainty.”388 
The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that the valuation was 
not clearly erroneous and affirmed the distribution of the mineral 
interests.389  The North Dakota Supreme Court also denied Cheryl’s cross-
appeals.390  The court reasoned that, although Thomas spent a substantial 
amount of money during the divorce and also failed to maintain the home, 
the district court did not error when it distributed “the martial estate nearly 
equally between the parties.”391  The court also held that the district court 
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INDIANS—REAL PROPERTY—RIGHTS OF WAY AND EASEMENTS 
 Arrow Midstream Holdings, LLC v. 3 Bears Construction, LLC 
 
In a contract dispute, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and 
remanded having concluded that the district court did have jurisdiction over 
the breach of contract and construction lien case between Arrow Midstream 
Holdings, LLC and Arrow Pipeline, LLC (“Arrow”), Tesla Enterprises, 
LLC (“Tesla”), and 3 Bears Construction, LLC (“3 Bears”).393 
Arrow had acquired a right-of-way easement over Indian Trust Land on 
the Fort Berthold Reservation from the Bureau of Indian Affairs.394 Arrow 
then hired 3 Bears, a business in New Town owned by two members of the 
Three Affiliated Tribes, to be the general contractor for the construction of 
a pipeline on the easement.395  3 Bears in turn contracted with Tesla, a 
company based in Alaska, for materials and labor for the pipeline.396 
Tesla filed a pipeline lien against Arrow over a dispute Tesala had with 
3 Bears regarding work Tesla had completed but were not properly 
compensated for.397 Arrow filed suit in district court disputing the pipeline 
lien, seeking indemnification, and claiming that 3 Bears had also breached 
its contract with Arrow.398  In district court, 3 Bears moved to dismiss for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.399  3 Bears then filed a complaint against 
both Tesla and Arrow in Tribal Court seeking a declaration that the lien was 
invalid, alleging that Arrow breached its contract with 3 Bears, and 
requesting damages.400  The district court concluded that their jurisdiction 
would infringe on Tribal sovereignty and Arrow and Tesla should have 
exhausted their tribal court remedies before coming to the district court.401  
The district court agreed with 3 Bears and dismissed the action without 
prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.402 
On appeal, 3 Bears denied the North Dakota Supreme Court 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal because it was dismissed by the district court 
without prejudice.403  Relying on Winer v. Penny Enterprises,404 the 
 
393. Arrow Midstream Holdings, LLC v. 3 Bears Construction, LLC, 2015 ND 302, ¶1, 873 
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394. Id. ¶ 2, 873 N.W.2d at 18. 
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supreme court concluded that the action was appealable.405  Arrow argued 
that the Tribal Court had no jurisdiction to decide this case and contended 
the district court erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction406  The supreme 
court relied on Strate v. A-1 Construction,407 which held that without 
congressional permission, Tribal Courts lack civil jurisdiction over 
nonmembers or non-Indians on reservations.408  However, the court noted 
Montana v. United States409 carved out two exceptions to this general 
rule.410  The district court concluded that the first Montana exception of a 
consensual relationship did not apply to this case because 3 Bears is not a 
member of the tribe; rather, it is organized as a North Dakota company.411  
The North Dakota Supreme Court found that this decision was in-line with 
the precedent of Airvator.412  For that reason, the court agreed with the 
district court that the first Montana exception of a consensual relationship 
did not apply to this case.413 
The district court relied on the second Montana exception in 
determining it lacked jurisdiction over this dispute.414  The district court 
specifically determined that the pipeline right-of-way easement was not 
“non-Indian fee land” and the dispute was over business activity, not 
land.415  In response, Arrow relied on Strate to dispute this position.416  The 
North Dakota Supreme Court held (1) granting rights-of-way over Indian 
lands is a congressional power, (2) the Tribe did not refuse the pipeline or 
reserve any rights to control the easement, and (3) relying on Adams417 and 
Red Wolf,418 the right-of-way that Arrow acquired was non-Indian fee 
land.419 
To determine state court jurisdiction,420 the court turned to Williams v. 
Lee,421 also noting their own precedent: “state court jurisdiction is 
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Co., 329 N.W.2d 596 (N.D. 1983). 
413. Id. ¶ 17, 873 N.W.2d at 21. 
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416. Id. ¶ 19, 873 N.W.2d at 22. 
417. Big Horn Cty. Elec. Coop, Inc. v. Adams, 219 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2000). 
418. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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421. 358 U.S. 217 (1959). 
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foreclosed if it is preempted by incompatible federal law or if it would 
undermine the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be 
ruled by them.”422  3 Bears claimed they were properly under this precedent 
by relying on the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, the Constitution of the 
Three Affiliated Tribes, the Tribal Employment Rights Ordinance, and the 
Fort Berthold Tribal Code.423  The court noted that this gives the Tribe 
powers to form their own government but does not preempt the state district 
court from hearing this case.424  The supreme court specified that this case 
pertained to the validity of a pipeline lien under state law and there was no 
Tribal law to address pipeline liens.425  The court viewed this case as a 
matter of contractual dispute between non-members of the Tribe on non-
Indian fee land.426  For that reason, the court held the Tribal Court lacked 
jurisdiction and the district court, not being foreclosed by any federal law, 
had proper jurisdiction.427 
The district court alternatively held that Arrow and Tesla should have 
exhausted their Tribal Court remedies before taking their case to state 
court.428  3 Bears supported that position by relying on various 
precedents.429  The North Dakota Supreme Court rejected this argument and 
declined to address it because it was “either unnecessary to the decision or [ 
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REAL PROPERTY LAW—DEEDS—AMOUNT OF CONVEYANCE 
 EOG Resources, Inc. v.  Soo Line Railroad Co. 
 
In EOG Resources, Inc. v. Soo Line Railroad Co.,431 Soo Line appealed 
a summary judgment ruling holding that Soo Line does not own minerals 
under property in Mountrail County, quieting title to EOG Resources 
instead.432  The district court held that seven private deeds did not convey a 
fee simple title to Soo Line’s predecessor-in-interest, but only easements.433  
The North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed, holding that six of the seven 
deeds unambiguously granted fee simple title to the railroad and the seventh 
deed, while ambiguous, should be remanded for trial.434 
EOG filed a quiet title action claiming an interest in the minerals in the 
disputed property.435  Soo Line argued that a condemnation order and seven 
deeds executed in 1914, 1915, and 1916 by Henry Olson provided their 
predecessor in interest, Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway 
Company, with a fee simple title to the surface and minerals of the 
property.436  The district court concluded that the condemnation order and 
the private deeds each granted Soo Line only an easement across the 
property via its predecessor-in-interest.437  Although each deed’s granting, 
warranty, and habendum clause language was consistent with a grant of fee 
simple, the deeds included the term “right of way” in the title which created 
uncertainty. 438  After examining other factors such as the size and shape of 
the interest, the purpose of the conveyance, a release from damages clause 
and extrinsic evidence, the district court quieted title to EOG Resources.439 
Since the district court found in favor of EOG Resources on summary 
judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the decision de novo 
on the entire record, examining whether any genuine issues of material fact 
 
431. 2015 ND 187, 867 N.W.2d 308. 
432. EOG Resources, Inc., ¶ 1, 867 N.W.2d at 311.  Soo Line has subsequently leased the 
mineral rights to G-4, LLC, who was also a party to the litigation.  Id. 
433. Id. 
434. Id. ¶ 46, 867 N.W.2d at 322. 
435. Id. ¶ 3, 867 N.W.2d at 311. 
436. Id. ¶ 4, 867 N.W.2d at 312.  G-4 filed a separate answer and cross-claims requesting 
that the court quiet title in Soo Line based not only on the seven deeds but also under the March 2, 
1899 Act of Congress.  Id. ¶ 5.  Subsequently in the litigation, the parties stipulated that the 1899 
Act only provided the railroad with an easement, causing the court to dismiss G-4’s claims 
regarding the 1899 Act.  Id. ¶ 8. 
437. Id. ¶ 12, 867 N.W.2d at 313. 
438. Id. 
439. Id. 
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existed.440  Soo Line and G-4 did not appeal the district court’s ruling with 
regard to the condemnation order but only the seven private deeds.441 
In general, the court reviews deeds in the same way they interpret 
contracts.442  The critical issue when interpreting a deed is ascertaining the 
grantor’s intent, which should be ascertained from the writing alone if the 
deed is unambiguous.443  A deed is ambiguous if “rational arguments can be 
made in support of contrary positions as to the meaning of the term, phrase, 
or clause in question.”444  If a deed is ambiguous, only then can a court 
consider extrinsic evidence regarding the intent of the parties.445  Generally, 
if a deed is ambiguous and reasonable differences of opinion exist as to its 
interpretation, summary judgment is not appropriate.446 
First, the North Dakota Supreme Court dismissed EOG Resource’s 
comparison of Lalim v. Williams County447 to this case.  In Lalim, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court examined whether a county acquired a fee simple 
title or easement when purchasing land for highway purposes.448  The court 
held that although the deed was “a warranty deed purporting to grant, 
bargain, sell and convey” “all that tract or parcel of land and real estate,” 
only an easement was conveyed because the plat created ambiguity and a 
fee simple grant would have divided the grantor’s land.449  In distinguishing 
the case, the North Dakota Supreme Court noted that Lalim involved a deed 
between a private party and the government whereas the current case 
involved only private parties.450  Furthermore, the deed language in Lalim 
was significantly different from the language in the seven private deeds in 
this case.451 
Next, the court proceeded to examine each of the seven deeds, placing 
them into three groups.452  The first group, containing five deeds, were 
entitled “WARRANTY DEED—RIGHT OF WAY” and stated that the 
grantors “do hereby, GRANT, BARGAIN, SELL and CONVEY” their 
 
440. Id. ¶ 13. 
441. Id. ¶ 14, 867 N.W.2d at 314. 
442. Id. ¶ 15. 
443. Id. 
444. Id. 
445. Id. ¶ 16. 
446. Id. 
447. 105 N.W.2d 339 (N.D. 1960). 
448. EOG Resources, Inc., ¶ 18, 867 N.W.2d at 314. 
449. Id. ¶¶ 18-19, 867 N.W.2d at 314-15.  The property in Lalim was depicted on a “right of 
way plat.” Id. ¶ 19, 867 N.W.2d at 315. 
450. Id. ¶ 20. 
451. Id. 
452. Id. ¶ 22, 867 N.W.2d at 316.  The court could do this because all of the deeds are on 
pre-printed forms with similar provisions.  Id. ¶ 21, 867 N.W.2d at 315. 
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interest to the Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway 
Company.453  The specific language of the granting clause is most 
important to determining the intent of the grantee, and a deed which 
conveys a piece of land generally indicates an intent to convey a fee simple 
title.454  More specifically, a deed limiting the use of a parcel to railroad 
purposes may be considered an easement, while conveyances without 
additional limiting language are usually construed as passing a fee simple 
estate.455   
Since the granting clause in this case does not limit the usage of the 
property, it appears that a fee simple interest was conveyed, a theory that 
the habendum and warranty clauses seem to support.456  The warranty and 
habendum clauses do not limit the grant in any way, and similar clauses in 
other disputes have been found to illustrate an intent to convey a fee simple 
title.457  The court dismissed EOG Resources’ claim that the inclusion of 
“right of way” in the title suggests less than a fee simple because the term 
“right of way” has two meanings when used in railroad deeds.458  While 
inclusion of “right of way” in the granting clause may indicate intent 
contrary to a fee simple, its inclusion in the title has not been held to be a 
significant factor.459  The court also dismissed EOG Resources’ claim that 
the liability release clause indicates intent to grant less than a fee simple 
because the release clause in this case relates to the property adjacent to the 
granted property which the grantor continued to own.460  Since the language 
of the deeds unambiguously granted a fee simple title to the railroad, the 
court held no extrinsic evidence is permissible and reversed the district 
court judgment.461 
The Larson deed was the only one in the second group considered by 
the court.462  First, the court noted that the inclusion of a prior easement 
owned by the railroad in the Larson deed’s property description supports 
the idea that a fee simple interest was intended to be granted.463  The court 
also dismissed the idea that a release provision releasing the railroad from 
 
453. Id. ¶ 22, 867 N.W.2d at 316. 
454. Id. ¶ 24, 867 N.W.2d at 316-17. 
455. Id. at 317. 
456. Id. ¶¶ 25-26. 
457. Id. ¶ 26, 867 N.W.2d at 317-18. 
458. Id. ¶ 29, 867 N.W.2d at 318. 
459. Id.  The North Dakota Supreme Court also notes that the parties knew correct granting 
language for easements because they used it in the portion of the deed granting an easement for 
snow fences.  Id. ¶ 30. 
460. Id. ¶¶ 31-33, 867 N.W.2d at 319-20. 
461. Id. ¶ 36, 867 N.W.2d at 320. 
462. Id. ¶ 37. 
463. Id. ¶ 39, 867 N.W.2d at 321. 
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all claims for any damages or trespass committed during the construction of 
the railway created any ambiguity in the deed.464  Since no ambiguity 
existed, and the Larson deed contained the same granting, habendum and 
warranty clauses of the five leases above, the court held that the Larson 
deed conveyed a fee interest to the railroad.465 
The final deed to be considered was the Faro deed, which contained the 
same granting, warranty, habendum, release, and snow fence clauses as the 
other six deeds, as well as the same title.466  Although the deed on its face 
conveyed a fee simple, the property description is materially different than 
the others because it carved out an exception for the non-railway land lying 
on either side of the conveyance.467  Similar to Lalim above, the size and 
shape of the conveyance created an ambiguity as to whether the intent was 
to convey an easement or fee simple estate.468  Since it was ambiguous, 
extrinsic evidence may be allowed; however, the district court’s inference 
that in 1914, 1915, and 1916, “mineral interests probably interested no one” 
was not allowed on a summary judgment motion.469  Therefore, as to the 
Faro deed, the Supreme Court of North Dakota remanded it for further 
proceedings.470 
Chief Justice Vandewalle concurred and dissented, agreeing with the 
majority that the Faro deed is ambiguous and that summary judgment 
should be reversed.471  As to the other six deeds, Chief Justice Vandewalle 
believed that the majority and dissent both made good arguments and 
therefore would conclude that they were ambiguous and summary judgment 
regarding any deed was improper; the Chief Justice would remand  the 
entire case regarding the other deeds for trial.472 
Justice Sandstrom dissented with the majority opinion, primarily based 
on the historical context.473  He notes that these deeds were meant to simply 
accomplish what was normally conducted through condemnation and 
federal appropriation, a result which normally only created an easement.474  
Justice Sandstrom argues that the property description of the Olson deed, 
which parallels the others, creates ambiguity because it describes “[a]ll that 
 
464. Id. ¶ 40. 
465. Id. ¶¶ 37-41, 867 N.W.2d at 320-21. 
466. Id. ¶ 42, 867 N.W.2d at 321.  
467. Id. 
468. Id. ¶ 43. 
469. Id. ¶ 44, 867 N.W.2d at 322. 
470. Id. ¶ 46. 
471. Id. ¶¶ 50-51, 867 N.W.2d at 323 (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring and dissenting). 
472. Id. 
473. Id. ¶¶ 54-57, 867 N.W.2d at 323-24 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting). 
474. Id. ¶ 55, 867 N.W.2d at 323. 
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part” of the land and talks of the “railroad as the same is now located over 
and across.”475  Justice Sandstrom noted that once ambiguity is shown, the 
court should examine the context and notice that the purpose was 
undoubtedly to provide a right-of-way for the railroad.476  Since the railroad 
could have taken only an easement by condemnation, Justice Sandstrom 





























475. Id. ¶¶ 58-59, 867 N.W.2d at 324. He notes that this language should trump the 
boilerplate language of the deeds. Id. 
476. Id. ¶¶ 62-63, 867 N.W.2d at 324-25. 
477. Id. ¶ 68, 867 N.W.2d at 325. 
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REAL PROPERTY LAW—WATER RIGHTS—ACCRETION, 
BOUNDARIES, AND RIPARIAN RIGHTS 
 Norby v. Estate of Kuykendall 
 
In Norby v. Estate of Kuykendall,478 the Supreme Court of North 
Dakota reviewed an appeal by Rocky Norby after the district court quieted 
title to disputed property in James Kuykendall.479  The 96 acres of disputed 
property is on the border between Montana and North Dakota in an area 
where the Yellowstone River generally divides the parties, with Norby in 
Montana and Kuykendall in North Dakota.480 
Over time, the Yellowstone River has gradually moved east, eroding 
land from the east bank and depositing (accreting) land to its west bank.481 
At some point, the river moved into North Dakota, eventually leaving 96 
acres of accreted land between the North Dakota-Montana border and the 
west bank of the river.482  Neither party’s deeds represent the river as the 
boundary of the property, except that deeds in the chain of conveyance for 
the Kuykendalls state the conveyance as “less parts eroded” by or into the 
river.483  Although the Kuykendalls have paid the real estate taxes on the 
accreted land, the Norbys executed a quit claim deed conveying the land to 
Rocky Norby in 2005 and brought an action in 2012 to eject the 
Kuykendalls and quiet title in the Norbys.484 
Norby argued in both the district court and supreme court that he 
owned the land through the doctrine of riparian accretions.485  The 
Kuykendalls answered, claiming that the action was barred by the statute of 
limitations and laches.486  The district court, ignoring the Kuykendalls’ 
defenses, dismissed Norby’s argument noting that Norby does not own title 
to land in North Dakota and cannot get property in the state by accretion.487  
Since the district court found in favor of the Kuykendalls on summary 
judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court reviews the decision de novo 
on the entire record, examining whether any genuine issues of material fact 
exist.488 
 
478. 2015 ND 232, 869 N.W.2d 405. 
479. Norby, ¶ 1, 869 N.W.2d at 406. 
480. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. 
481. Id. ¶ 4. 
482. Id.  
483. Id. ¶ 2. 
484. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. 
485. Id. ¶ 5. 
486. Id. 
487. Id. at 406-07. 
488. Id. ¶ 7, 869 N.W.2d at 407. 
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The majority opinion for the North Dakota Supreme Court first notes 
that the border between Montana and North Dakota is fixed at the “twenty-
seventh meridian of longitude west from Washington.”489  The opinion then  
goes on to describe the North Dakota statute regarding riparian rights.490  
However, the majority notes that the statute is essentially a restatement of 
the well-established common law rule governing riparian rights.491 
At common law, the doctrines of accretion, dereliction, erosion, and 
avulsion apply where title to real property describes a boundary line as a 
body of water.492  If the boundary line is fixed by a line without reference to 
a body of water, the grantee of a deed cannot claim accretions beyond the 
line.493  The court notes that common sense supports the rule because 
riparian landowners are subject to the risk of losses and gains caused by the 
water.494  Past decisions have stressed that landowners whose land is 
bounded by water may have riparian rights, but where land is bounded by 
government lines, the North Dakota riparian statute does not apply.495 
Norby argues that since the deeds in the Kuykendalls’ chain of title 
state the conveyance is “less parts eroded [by or into] the Yellowstone 
River,” he deserves the 96 acres by accretion.496  The court disagreed 
because Norby’s own title does not include conveyance of any land in 
North Dakota, and any plaintiffs must rely on the strength of their own title 
in a quiet title action.497  Secondly, the court noted that the deeds in the 
chain of title refer only to erosion as opposed to accretion, meaning that 
“[e]xcepting land eroding into the river from the grant of property in the 
Kuykendalls’ deeds did not amount to a conveyance of accretions located in 
North Dakota to Norby.”498 
The court dismissed Norby’s argument that their ruling runs contrary to 
the rule that riparian rights have no regard for artificial boundaries, again 
making reference to the fact that the property boundary in this case is fixed 
 
489. Id. ¶ 8. 
490. Id.  The North Dakota statute says, “Where from natural causes land forms by 
imperceptible degrees upon the bank of a river or stream, navigable or not navigable, either by 
accumulation of material or by the recession of the stream, such land belongs to the owner of the 
bank, subject to any existing right of way over the bank.” N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-06-05 (2013). 
491. Norby, ¶ 8, 869 N.W.2d at 407. 
492. Id. 
493. Id. ¶ 9, 869 N.W.2d at 408. 
494. Id. ¶ 10. 
495. Id. ¶ 11, 869 N.W.2d at 409-10. 
496. Id. ¶ 12, 869 N.W.2d at 410. 
497. Id. 
498. Id.  
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without reference to water.499  The majority affirmed the district court 
ruling granting property interests to the Kuykendalls.500 
Justice Sandstrom concurred in the judgment but argued that the 
majority overemphasizes common law.501  Instead, Justice Sandstrom 
would simply apply section 47-06-05 and the court’s prior opinions in 
Perry v. Erling502 and Greeman v. Smith503 to limit the statute’s application 
to property borders defined by the body of water.504 
 
 
499. Id. ¶ 13, 869 N.W.2d at 410-11. 
500. Id. ¶ 14, 869 N.W.2d at 411. 
501. Id. ¶ 17 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting). 
502. 132 N.W.2d 889 (N.D. 1965). 
503. 138 N.W.2d 433 (N.D. 1965). 
504. Norby, ¶ 19, 869 N.W.2d at 411. 
